Here’s a link to the Carter Center’s  21-page preliminary statement on Sudan’s elections. I breezed through the bullets, and the center’s key points seem to be:

1) It wasn’t a fair election.

2) Still, the exercise was a necessary one to fulfill provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, thereby making it legal to hold next year’s (dis)unity referendum, in which the south will vote to leave Sudan.

3) It was good practice. (For the next unfair election?)

and,  importantly

4) Southerners didn’t get a fair shake either, thanks to intimidation by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.

It seems accurate based on my reading and interviews. The language is neutral, not condemnatory, which will annoy some. And it further confirms what a lousy deal this has been for so many people working towards real pluralism and democracy in Sudan.

My guess is there’s probably enough praise in the document to allow the Bashir regime to declare victory, despite a similar statement from the European Union.

For details, read after the jump, and by all means check the excellent reporting at the Sudan Tribune and Radio Dabanga — and please do let me know what you think.

The main findings of the Center’s mission to date are as follows:

 The April 2010 elections in Sudan were mandated by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and were envisioned as a critical part of a broader democratic transformation.

 Unfortunately, many political rights and freedoms were circumscribed for most of this period, fostering distrust among the major political parties.

 In the campaign period and run-up to the 2010 elections, however, there was a limited but important political opening that provided opportunities for opposition parties and civil society to engage in the political process. After a long period of dormancy, Sudanese parties and civic groups across the country began to mobilize.

 Most of the opposition parties joined together to demand the reform of laws and the lifting of restrictions of political freedoms and several major parties ultimately withdrew from the election shortly before election day. Although all candidates remained on the ballots, there was little competition in the race for the presidency and reduced competition in other races.

 The polling process on April 11-15 was largely peaceful and orderly. Despite confusion and significant logistical challenges, polling staff and voters in most areas displayed remarkable commitment, patience, and tolerance. Voters turned out in good numbers to cast their ballots, but with varying levels of participation across the country. The Sudanese people are to be commended for their civic spirit, pride, and hospitality.

 Notwithstanding these generally positive features, Carter Center observers noted important flaws and found that the process fell short of Sudan‟s obligations and related international standards in a number of respects.

 Sudan‟s legal framework is contradictory and does not ensure adequate respect for essential political rights and freedoms prescribed in Sudan‟s constitution, including freedoms of expression, assembly, and association.

 Although the voter registration process resulted in broad but uneven participation across the country, it was undermined by a series of critical shortcomings. Preliminary lists were not consistently posted for adequate public review, especially in the South, and the status of the final voter registry and list of polling stations remained uncertain. The Carter Center has recently received an electronic copy of the complete list and will attempt to ascertain if any of these changes were designed to assist particular political parties.

 On election days, voters faced a range of operational and logistical problems: late delivery of and/or inadequate materials, incomplete or inaccurate voters lists, incorrect or insufficient ballots, ballots with inappropriate languages, and a lack of consistency in procedures. These problems were partially alleviated by the extension of voting time by two days.

 Further, the electoral process lacked sufficient safeguards and transparency necessary to verify key steps and build confidence and trust in the process. Our observers reported problems with ink, ballot box seals, and the process of identifying voters, including the process of verifying voters‟ identity when registration certificates were issued by popular committees at the polling stations, as well as reports of underage voters casting ballots.

 There were large numbers of illiterate voters, and some evidence of election officials deliberately misrepresenting the desires of some voters.

 The elections in the South experienced a high incidence of intimidation and the threat or use of force. There were numerous instances of the Sudan Peoples‟ Liberation Army (SPLA) intimidating voters and being stationed too close to polling stations. State interference in the campaigns of opposition candidates was widespread in the South.

 The continuing state of emergency, repression of civil liberties, and ongoing conflict in Darfur did not permit an environment conducive to acceptable elections. Given the limited participation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Darfur in the census and voter registration, much of the population was left out of the process. Carter Center observers were unable to access wide areas of the region due to the security situation. While the areas they monitored were largely peaceful, they reported serious technical and procedural violations during the polling.

 In the months ahead, Sudanese political and civil society leaders from across the political spectrum should reaffirm their commitment to core democratic values. Sudan‟s government must ensure that the democratic opening is expanded and deepened. Full respect for human rights, democratic principles, and transparency will help to heal the mistrust that has detracted from the electoral process.

 It is important for Sudan to draw lessons from this election to ensure that the upcoming referenda and popular consultations do not have the same flaws, both technically and politically. Our Center and other international observers will have recommendations to assist in reaching this goal.

pdf: Preliminary Statement Final, April 17, 2010